The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, we propose a method for checking empirically whether inflation expectations are anchored in the long run, and at what level. The extent of anchoring then serves as a proxy for the credibility of the monetary authority. Second, to assess how well this measure proxies credibility, we cross-check it against periods for which the level of credibility is known and generally agreed upon. To this end, we apply our measure to the US inflation history since 1963, which includes both the period of the Great Inflation, in which credibility was poor and deteriorating, as well as the period of the Great Moderation during which credibility in the monetary authority was gradually re-established. Finally we check what our measure of credibility tells us about the crisis period.
Introduction
Numerous attempts in the literature on monetary policy have tried to de…ne credibility, explain why it is necessary and how it can be earned and maintained. Institutional commitment to a nominal anchor (Mishkin, 2007) , or any explicit form of commitment more generally, (Albanesi et al, 2003 and Gust, 2000) , are often thought to promote price stability and are considered crucial to managing in ‡ation expectations. Commitment, in general, is the key ingredient to establishing credibility, as shown in the more recent theory on optimal monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003) . Empirically, a number of studies have shown the bene…cial e¤ects of a successful commitment to a nominal anchor in terms of more stable and less persistent in ‡ation (Levin et al 2004 , Gürkaynak et al 2006 but also in terms of lower output volatility (Fatás et al 2007; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002, 2007) . We argue that commitment to a well de…ned and credible nominal anchor has an e¤ect on the dynamic relationship between in ‡ation expectations and realized in ‡ation. As such, a fully credible and transparent monetary policy provides an anchor for in ‡ation expectations and therefore de-couples them from short run in ‡ation dynamics (Demertzis and Viegi, 2009 ).
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: …rst, we propose a method for checking empirically whether in ‡ation expectations are anchored in the long run, and at what level. The extent of anchoring then serves as a proxy for the credibility of the monetary authority. Second, to assess how well this measure proxies credibility, we cross-check it against periods for which the level of credibility is known and generally agreed upon. To this end, we apply our measure to the US in ‡ation history since 1963, which includes the period of the Great In ‡ation, in which credibility is supposed to be poor and deteriorating, the period of the Great Moderation during which credibility in the monetary authority was gradually re-established, as well as the period since the mid 2007 which saw the start of the recent …nancial crisis, a period governed by large uncertainty. Beyond that we also examine the evolution of credibility during the early eighties. This period is associated with Volcker's Disin ‡a-tion, in which economic understanding became more sophisticated (Romer and Romer, 2002, Taylor 1998 ) and monetary policy makers worried explicitly about the way 'in ‡ationary psychology'was a¤ecting their ability to be e¤ec-tive (Goodfriend and King 2005) . Aiming to align expectations with their own in ‡ation objectives, as well as e¤ectively bring down in ‡ation, the Fed engaged in persistently aggressive policies. This was done at great cost to output in that period, but helped reverse the in ‡ationary trend thereafter, and hence improve credibility (Goodfriend 1993 (Goodfriend , 2007 ).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how the anchoring e¤ect and credibility can be formally measured and tested. Section 3 presents a number of stylized facts about US in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations that allow us to divide the sample into subperiods according to their level of credibility. Section 4 implements empirically the theoretical suggestions of Section 2 using US data for the subperiods identi…ed in Section 3. Section 5 generalizes the analysis by introducing a model for the entire period under analysis, starting in 1963, which allows for time-varying credibility. The estimation results are then used to discuss how our measure tracks the evolution of credibility in a number of well-documented monetary policy incidents. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
The Anchoring E¤ect
We start this section by describing how in ‡ation is a¤ected by the level of expectations in a simple theoretical model. Then we derive the econometric implications for the joint modelling of in ‡ation and long-term in ‡ation expectations. Finally, we introduce an empirical measure that proxies the monetary authority's credibility.
A simple model of in ‡ation determination
We consider a standard framework, in which the Central Bank chooses the rate of in ‡ation to minimize the distance from the in ‡ation objective set T and close the output gap y t , i.e.,
Depending on the underlying economy, optimization of (1) implies that,
where t is now the ex post in ‡ation outcome conditional on the shock t , before solving for private sector expectations, e t . 1 In a typical commitment 1 The parameter 1 is de…ned by the underlying model. For example, for the standard Neo-Keynesian model based on Clarida et al. (1999) ,
set-up, where the Central Bank commits to the target T , expectations formed are equal to the CB's objectives, e t = T , and the ex post outcome (2) is:
However, it is questionable whether empirically it is justi…ed to reduce (2) into (3). Rather than impose an anchor for expectations, we would like to explore how in ‡ation expectations actually evolve.
There are a number of ways recent contributions in the literature depart from the full information set-up. A heuristic expectations formation (Brazier et al 2008), or monetary policy as an information game Viegi, 2008, 2009 ), or expectations learning (e.g. Orphanides and Williams, 2005) , all constitute such examples. In their simplest form however, these approaches imply that when looking at expectations across time, they would be partly time dependent and partly time invariant. We identify the extent to which expectations are time invariant with the anchoring e¤ect. Bom…n and Rudebusch (2000) model this feature by assuming that long-run in ‡ation expectations at time t are a weighted average of a constant (which in their case is the current target) and last period's in ‡ation rate 2 :
The parameter (2 [0; 1]) then measures the degree to which expectations are anchored. If = 1, in ‡ation expectations are perfectly anchored to the constant , which for in ‡ation targeting regimes can be cross-checked against the in ‡ation objective T communicated. Credible regimes will then be those for which both = 1 as well as = T . 3 It follows that if t = 0, there is no credibility, the in ‡ation target is ignored in the formation of expectations which simply follow past in ‡ation.
the structural representation of the ex post in ‡ation outcome is:
Our point is to show that the ex post outcome is a function of both the CB objective as well as the expectations of the private sector at the relevant horizon (and naturally the shocks). 2 If expectations are formed according to an information game, then (5) is a very good proxy for the way they are generated across time and therefore, consistent with optimizing agents. 3 It follows that is the Central Bank's in ‡ation target, as perceived by those who form expectations.
Note that this notion of credibility applies to long horizons, which are no longer a¤ected by policy. That is why expectations considered in this context refer to the long-run (in our case the 10-year horizon). This de…nition does not necessarily preclude anchored expectations in the short-term, but the movement of expectations in the short-run is not necessarily evidence of lack of credibility.
Remark 1 For countries that do not have an explicit in ‡ation objective, such as the US, the value of the parameter alone is then a proxy for credibility. 4 In the next subsection we will identify …ve features concerning the evolution of in ‡ation, long term in ‡ation expectations, and their relationship in the presence of perfect credibility ( = 1). Then, we will propose an empirical proxy for the extent of credibility.
Testing for the Anchoring E¤ect
The main observation of the previous analysis is that a credible regime will be characterized by a disconnect between in ‡ation and long-run in ‡ation expectations dynamics. In what follows we identify how this disconnect would manifest itself in the data, and then how in ‡ation expectations are anchored once they are disconnected from historical in ‡ation experience.
Following (2) and (5), and allowing for the presence of dynamics, we model t and e t in the following VAR speci…cation:
e 1t e 2t i:i:d: 0 0 ; 11 12 12 22 :
Conjecture 1: A credible in ‡ation expectations disconnect would imply that the following hypotheses are satis…ed: 4 In his testimony to the US House of representatives, on the 27th of February 2008, chairman Bernanke said the following: "The in ‡ation projections submitted by FOMC participants for 2010-which ranged from 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent for overall PCE in ‡ation-were importantly in ‡uenced by participants' judgments about the measured rates of in ‡ation consistent with the Federal Reserve's dual mandate and about the time frame over which policy should aim to attain those rates." This was very much interpreted as an informal in ‡a-tion target (see, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-sets-informal-in ‡ation-target-of-15-to-2 or http://www.usin ‡ationcalculator.com/interest-rates/long-term-in ‡ation-targetof-17-to-2-set-by-fed/1000388/) H1: Expected in ‡ation is not a¤ected by lagged actual in ‡ation, i.e., c(L) = 0.
H2: Expected in ‡ation is anchored to an intercept on average, i.e., c(L) = 0 and d(L) = 0.
H3: Actual in ‡ation is not a¤ected by expected in ‡ation, i.e., b(L) = 0.
H4:
The persistence of actual in ‡ation, the sum of the coe¢ cients of a(L); decreases with credibility.
H5:
There is no contemporaneous transmission of shocks from actual to expected in ‡ation and vice versa, i.e., 12 = 0.
We test hypotheses H1-H3 with standard Wald tests. In particular, H1 and H3 correspond to Granger non-causality of, respectively, actual in ‡ation for expected in ‡ation, and expected in ‡ation for actual in ‡ation. If there is evidence of some heteroskedasticity in the errors, we apply a robust (HAC based) version of the Wald test. We examine H4 by comparing estimated in ‡ation persistence in di¤erent periods for which the level of monetary policy credibility is known. H5 can be veri…ed by checking the non-signi…cance of the correlation between the VAR errors (corr(e 1t ; e 2t ) = 0) according to a Fisher transform test. Note that H1, H3 and H5 jointly imply that all elements of the impulse response function (IRF) of actual in ‡ation to a shock in expectations are zero, and the same should hold for the IRF of expected in ‡ation to a shock in actual in ‡ation.
The hypotheses that we have identi…ed in this subsection should hold only in the presence of perfect credibility, namely, = 1. When they are rejected, it is however interesting to have a measure of the extent of the credibility of the monetary authority, and a natural proposal is an estimate of . In the next subsection we discuss how to obtain such an estimate of .
A Proxy for Credibility
We turn next to the way expectations are formed. Note that (5) assumes that in ‡ation expectations do not depend on their own past behavior, i.e., d(L) = 0 in (6) . However, this hypothesis should be tested and, as we will see in the next section, it is empirically systematically rejected. Hence, we use a VAR approach to provide a more general measure of . Our prior is that credible monetary policy implies that expectations are de-coupled from in ‡ation (low correlation) and are anchored to an 'implicit' target. Expectations are then partly following that implicit 'anchor' . We derive the values of and next.
Consider for simplicity the VAR(1) version of (6):
e t = c 0 + c t 1 + d e t 1 + e 2t ; which in equilibrium reduces to:
Matching coe¢ cients of (5) and (9), it follows that:
and therefore,
Empirically, and can be estimated by substituting parameters c 0 , c and d with their estimates from system (7) . The parameter will serve as a proxy for credibility and the estimated value of as the implicit long-term anchor for in ‡ation expectations 6 . 5 See Appendix A for a general result based on a high-order VAR(p). 6 Alternatively we could derive and from equation (8) which would give = 1 ( (1 a)=b) and = a(0)=b The reason that we do not use this alternative derivationof is twofold: …rst, from condition H3 on page 4, we expect that credibility will produce a parameter b = 0, thus making the ratios a(0)=b and (1 a)=b not de…ned. More importantly, one implication of credibility (i.e. = 1) would be that (1 a)=b = 0, which is true for a = 1. Because the (a) parameter is the autoregressive parameter in the in ‡ation equation 8, this would mean that when expectations are anchored the in ‡ation process is a random walk. This result is dependent on the reduced form nature of speci…cation (8): if we use a di¤erent speci…cation for the stochastic in ‡ation process the results would be di¤erent. On the other hand the derivation of from equation (9) is consistent with the hypothesis H1 H5 on page 4 and is independent on the speci…cation on the in ‡ation process: when expectations are anchored, i.e. = 1; c = 0 and the expectation process is independent on the in ‡ation process.
Last, we make the following remarks. First, in (10) is not constrained to belong to the [0,1] interval. Using the VAR coe¢ cients it can be re-written as:
which yields
Second, we estimate the VARs over sub-periods when credibility is believed to be fairly constant, in order to avoid instability in the VAR parameters. In Section 5 we will consider a more general approach based on full sample estimation of a time-varying VAR, to allow for the temporal evolution of credibility.
Finally, our proxy for credibility is equivalent to the one employed by King (1995) , who analyzes the di¤erence between long-run in ‡ation expectations (derived from nominal and real yield curves) and in ‡ation targets. It is also close to the expectations de…nitions in Johnson (1998 Johnson ( , 2002 and Croushore and Koot (1994) , who use short-run in ‡ation expectations from surveys.
Stylized facts
In this Section we brie ‡y summarize the US in ‡ation history from 1963 to 2011. Our main analysis is based on series for CPI in ‡ation 7 and long-term expectations produced by the FRB/US model of the Federal Reserve Board. 8 We will also use the 6-10 years Consensus Forecasts (semi-annual, based on CPI) but this series is only available since 1990. 7 Quarterly, y-o-y changes of CPI, 1963q1-2011q2. Appendix C will discuss also our main results based on PCE series for in ‡ation, as this is the one used to represent in ‡ation most often. However, Clark (1999) argues that when comparing the pros and cons of the two series CPI is the better index. 8 The FRB/US series for long term in ‡ation expectations is constructed as follows. For data from 1991q4 through 2006q4, the FRB series is exactly equal to SPF -0.5, where SPF: Philadelphia Fed Survey of Prof Forecasters: CPI In ‡ation Rate Over the Next 10 Years, Median (%). From 2007q1, the FRB series is just the SPF median for PCE in ‡ation, with no constant adjustment. From 1980 to 1991, the FRB series splices SPF data for 1991-present from the Hoey survey, and for data prior to 1980, it uses an econometric estimate based on a learning model developed by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) . Even though FRB/US aims to track CPE in ‡ation, it is based on information on CPI for most of the period examined. This is why we choose to show the results based on CPI in the main text. We thank Todd Clark and Robert Tetlow for information on the data. Figure 1 plots CPI in ‡ation and FRB long term expectations. The literature typically identi…es three distinct periods in the conduct and e¤ectiveness of monetary policy (Goodfriend, 2007) . First is the period of the Great In ‡ation during the late '60s and '70s, when in ‡ation was steadily increasing with three noticeable peaks at 1969q4, 1974q4 and 1980q1, (see …gure 1). The on-going debate on the sources of this pattern for in ‡ation, summarized in Cecchetti et al. (2007) , attributes it mostly to the behavior of oil and raw material prices, combined with an insu¢ ciently tight monetary policy. Over this period, in‡ation expectations were also steadily increasing, but remained systematically below actual in ‡ation. This is generally considered a period of deteriorating credibility. The second period identi…ed, the '80s, is characterized by a decline in the level of in ‡ation, associated with the Volcker Disin ‡ation. Figure 1 shows that the decline in the long term FRB expectations was less pronounced, with a prolonged period of expectations above actual in ‡ation. Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that this was also a period of poor credibility, which was the cause of the high costs of disin ‡ation observed. In the third period, identi…ed from approximately 1991 till the start of the …nancial crisis in 2007, we observe relatively stable in ‡ation accompanied by a further decline in the long term in ‡ation expectations, which stabilizes at a value around 2 per cent after 2000. This is generally believed to be a period of relatively high credibility. Although too soon to be looked at as a separate period, we also look at the latest years from 2007 till 2011, as a period of very high in ‡ation volatility and generally great …nancial and macroeconomic uncertainty. In ‡ation is more volatile than in the previous period but expectations do not follow a similar pattern. This is a rather short period but given the distinct nature of the …nancial crisis that occurred, it is worth looking at separately.
In ‡ation and In ‡ation Expectations
A similar picture emerges when looking at the descriptive statistics for the corresponding periods in Table 1 . We report the standard statistics as well as the level of persistence and the correlation of actual and expected in ‡a-tion. 9 Average and median values of actual and expected in ‡ation steadily decrease across the three …rst periods, and average expected in ‡ation is higher than average actual in ‡ation, only in the second period, the '80s. The range and standard deviation shrink progressively over time. While this is a well known feature for in ‡ation, a similar pattern emerges also for expectations, the standard deviation of which reduces from 1:41 in 1968-80 to 0:54 in 1991-06. Furthermore, there is a noticeable decrease in the persistence of in ‡ation. This is not the case for in ‡ation expectations. In addition, the correlation between actual and expected in ‡ation drops from 0:81 in the '70s to 0:40 in 91-06 and is statistically insigni…cant after the year 2000. The latter period is also characterized by a major drop in the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation expectations. Our results remain unchanged if we move the start and ending point of the three periods by a few quarters.
This statistic is approximately normally distributed, with zero mean and standard deviation = (n 3)
, where n is the sample size. Bold indicates signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level. Last, we examine how FRB long term in ‡ation expectations compare to the consensus forecast measure of in ‡ation expectations for overlapping periods. Figure 2 plots the two series as well as CPI in ‡ation. Table 2 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for long term expectations, the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Forecast. Note: bold indicates signi…cance at the 5% level.
The di¤erences between the two measures of expectations are minor: FRB has a slightly lower average 10 and median value and shorter range of variability. Overall the two series of in ‡ation expectations move closely together, (correl(Cons, FRB)=0.96). The contemporaneous correlation of actual and expected in ‡ation is 0.47 and 0.40, for the two measures respectively. However, these values can be spuriously upward biased, due to their overall decreasing behavior in the period examined. Hence, the issue of correlation needs to be addressed within a formal dynamic model, as we show in the next section.
In ‡ation and Expectations Disconnect
We implement next the measures and tests suggested in Section 2, using data for the sub-periods identi…ed in Section 3. We present results for the period between 1968 and 1980 as a period of low credibility, using the series on FRB expectations only. We then test our model for the period between 1990 and 2007, as one where monetary policy is relatively credible. For this latter period we also carry out tests based on alternative expectations series. Finally we have a brief look at the relation between in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the crisis period, 2007-2011. We provide additional robustness checks in Appendixes B.1 and B.2.
1968-1980: A Period of Low credibility
The period generally associated with the Great In ‡ation starts in 1965 and is to last for about 20 years, after which Volcker's period of disin ‡ation begins to bear results. This period is also associated with low and deteriorating credibility and generally an inability to control in ‡ation (Cecchetti et al 2007) . Meltzer (2005) attributes this to a number of reasons, including both lack of knowledge of how the underlying economy worked at the time, as well policy and institutional arrangements made. Given this general description of the time-period, we evaluate the performance of the VAR model and the outcome of tests for hypotheses 1-5, for the period up to the end of 1979.
11
Our choice of ending the period in 1979 is motivated by Volcker's appointment 10 Note that FRB expectations were constructed to be consistent with CPE, which for the period examined had a lower mean. This may account for the lower mean. 11 Note that if is equal, or close, to zero, the VAR framework is not suited due to perfect collinearity between the regressors. In this case a single equation approach along the lines of (5) would be appropriate. However, we have never found such a case to be true in practice (correlations in Table 1 are at most 0.81).
as chairman of the Federal Reserve, which is identi…ed with the start of a new era in monetary policy e¤ectiveness. Our main …nding is that over this period hypotheses 1 and 3, no e¤ects of actual in ‡ation on long term expectations and vice versa, are strongly rejected, (see Table 3 below). Hypothesis 5 is not rejected, indicating that there is still no evidence of contemporaneous shock transmission (insigni…cant correlation). In summary, there appears to be a lot of interaction between actual in ‡ation and long term in ‡ation expectations over a period of low credibility. Based on the VAR(6) choice, the IRFs in …gure 3 12 show that there is great persistence in both in ‡ation as well as expectations and both variables a¤ect each other in the long-run.
Our analysis implies that for a period of generally deteriorating performance in in ‡ation and low credibility, there is a close relationship between in ‡ation and the way expectations are formed, even in the long run.
1990-2007: A Period of High Credibility
Goodfriend (2007) describes US monetary policy of this period as follows: "Under Greenspan's leadership, the Fed demonstrated additional practical principles of monetary policy that have become part of the new consensus. The most important is that monetary policy could sustain low in ‡ation with low unemployment on average, and with infrequent, mild recessions."This period is one in which in ‡ation is on a long declining trend, eventually becoming stationary after the year 2000. We check for the anchoring e¤ect in this period based on two alternative measures for expectations.
The lag length selection criteria indicate 5 lags for the series FRB and 1 lag for the Consensus Forecasts. From the Wald tests for hypotheses 1 and Response of INFL to FRB reported in table 4 below, expected in ‡ation is not signi…cant in the actual in ‡ation equation, and vice versa. 13 Moreover, the correlation of the VAR residuals is not statistically di¤erent from zero for the Consensus series although the test fails when using FRB expectations. As already mentioned, the joint validity of hypotheses 1, 3, 5 should imply that each value of the cross IRF is not statistically di¤erent from zero. This is indeed the case, with the only exception of the small and positive reaction of 13 A robust version of the Wald test yields the same results, the p-values are, respectively, 0.56 and 0.56. the FRB expectation measure (in line with the …ndings in Table 4 Response of FRB to FRB Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 4: FRB Expectations, 1989-2007
Hypothesis 2 however, (no persistence in expected in ‡ation), is strongly rejected. The estimated persistence (the coe¢ cient of lagged expected in ‡ation in this case), for example for Consensus forecasts is 0.95, similar to the result from the AR(4) reported in Table 1 . The estimated persistence in in ‡ation is instead 0.57, again in line with the previous …nding based on the AR(4) model. Figures 4-5 con…rm the higher persistence of in ‡ation expectations, but they also highlight the fact that shocks that hit expectations are much smaller in size by comparison to in ‡ation.
When looking at the data for SPF directly (available from the authors), the results are identical to those shown by Consensus Forecasts. Summarizing, our results for this period, using alternative measures for in ‡ation expectations, show weak or no contemporaneous or dynamic statistically signi…cant correlation between actual values and long term in ‡ation expectations. This stands in contrast to the earlier period described above, where the relationship between the two variables was tighter. There appears therefore to be a disconnect between in ‡ation and expectations for periods when monetary policy is generally considered to be credible. 
2007-2011: Financial Crisis and Uncertainty
We look next at the period of the …nancial crisis since 2007. Although the sample is somewhat limited, in this period the disconnect between in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations seems to be even stronger than in the period between 1990 and 2007. We report the Wald tests for hypotheses 1 and 3 in table 5 below and see that expected in ‡ation is not signi…cant in the actual in ‡ation equation, and vice versa, and the correlation in the VAR residuals is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Moreover, there is a lower persistence in expected in ‡ation, with an estimated persistence 0.63, compared to the previous period but a marginally higher persistence in in ‡ation (0.67 versus 0.57). While the variance of in ‡a-tion is changed signi…cantly, the shocks to expectations are extremely small. This set of results is con…rmed by the IRF graphed in Figure 6 . Response of INFL to FRB Response of FRB to FRB Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Figure 6: FRB Expectations 2007-2011
This is an indication that the credibility of the Federal Reserve has not so far been substantially a¤ected by the crisis. However, it is worth mentioning that with respect to the 1990-2007 period, during 2007-2011 average in ‡ation has decreased from 2.76 to 2.12, while average in ‡ation expectations have increased from 1.95 to 2.13 14 . Overall, in this section we have seen that the relationship between in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations has indeed changed over time. The exact start/end dates of the di¤erent subperiods are rather uncertain, and in addition there could be some within subperiod instability. Therefore, in the next section we move to a full sample analysis based on a time-varying parameter model.
A Generalized Measure of the Anchoring E¤ect
So far we have assumed that there are discrete changes in the parameters of the VAR in (6) , which are associated with periods with di¤erent monetary policy credibility. Next we construct a time varying measure of credibility derived from the de…nition in equation (10) . To construct this measure, …rst we estimate a VARs with time-varying parameters over the whole sample. This is done along the lines of, for example, Stock and Watson (1996) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) , or Clark and Nakata (2008) . Based on the estimated timevarying VAR coe¢ cients, we estimate how the credibility of the monetary authority, i.e. t in equation (10), also varies over time.
Based on Stock and Watson (1996) we specify a time-varying VAR(1) version of (6) as follows:
where each parameter is assumed to evolve according to a random walk, the errors of the random walks are uncorrelated among themselves and with the VAR errors. We assume, in turn, that the VAR errors are uncorrelated and homoskedastic. We estimate the model above by maximum likelihood, using the Kalman …lter, and …gure 7 reports the (smoothed) estimates of the time-varying parameters for equation (14) which we will use to estimate the anchoring e¤ect. Parameter c t is higher in the '70s and early '80s, declines after that, and reaches values close to zero in the most recent period. The d t parameter increases steadily up to the early '80s, then declines until the end of the '90s, and stabilizes afterwards. Again these results are coherent with the picture emerging from the split-sample VARs. In the absence of credibility, in ‡ation expectations are more persistent, and can be directly a¤ected by the evolution of actual in ‡ation, while the two variables are de-coupled when credibility is restored. Evidence for the last part of the sample suggests that the credibility has been negatively a¤ected by the crisis. 16 Based on the estimated parameters above, we compute a measure of the time varying credibility as follows:
which generalizes the constant measure from equation (10) . Figure 8 plots the values for t and two standard error bands 17 and shows that it, and by proxy also credibility, has varied signi…cantly across the whole period.
Using our estimated t , we can in turn estimate the implicit time-varying anchor of long term in ‡ation expectations as follows:
which generalizes the formula in equation (11) . While the estimated t indicates the extent to which expectations are anchored to a constant, (and therefore, past in ‡ation does not a¤ect expectations), t provides an estimate of that anchor 18 . Figure 9 plots CPI in ‡ation and FRB expectations, as well as the estimated values for the time-varying and . 19 The estimated values for t and t 16 We …nd much more evidence of instability in the relation between actual and long term expected in ‡ation than Clark and Nakata (2008) . This is due to di¤erent speci…cation choices (see Appendix C for a detailed discussion). 17 The error band is generate from the joint distribution of the parameters in (15) using the following approxiamation var
18 We use the expected values and standard deviation of a quotient of stochastic variables as follows: 19 Ireland (2007) allows for the target to adjust to the technology shock, the cost push shock and the monetary authority's preference parameters. He presents very similar empirical estimates for to those in …gure 8 across the same period, in particular when assuming backward-looking price setting, which would be consistent with our VAR set-up. century. Its economic cost was large. It destroyed the Bretton Woods system of …xed exchange rates, bankrupted much of the thrift industry, heavily taxed the U.S. capital stock, and arbitrarily redistributed income and wealth."Our proxy for credibility, t , exhibits a considerable decline in this period, starting from a value of 1 and reducing to a value 0.75. At the same time, the implicit long run anticipated in ‡ation increased steadily, following the trend, and level, of FRB expectations closely. This is in our view consistent with the perception that for this period monetary policy was loosing credibility. The period from the end of the 1970s and early 1980s was to see two important events for the course of in ‡ation thereafter: …rst was the appointment of Volcker at the summer of 1979 and second, in ‡ation reached its peak in the …rst quarter of 1980. This marked the start of what has come to be known as the 'Volcker Disin ‡ation' period associated with the start of a long and declining path for in ‡ation for the following 10-15 years. And while there is no doubt about the importance of this period in terms of altering the longterm in ‡ation trend, there is some discussion as to what the associated cost has been. Goodfriend and King (2005) argue that "...the reduction in in ‡ation .. because it was viewed as not credible, in the sense that …rms and households believed for several years that the reduction in in ‡ation was temporary with a return to high in ‡ation likely.", (p983). Figure 8 concurs with this view, in the sense that the value of t in that period is the lowest in the whole sample. It also shows that even though in ‡ation reached its peak in 1980q1, credibility continued to fall for another four quarters before changing direction. It required therefore a year of rapidly declining in ‡ation before the public began to change its opinion. This delay in public perceptions is also alluded to by Goodfriend and King (2005) Figure 10 concentrates on the Volcker disin ‡ation period, which saw four 'in ‡ation scares' identi…ed by Goodfriend (1993) . 21 Our objective is to map the evolution of the credibility proxy during this period to the events themselves. The …rst of these in ‡ation scares was observed at the start of 1980. "In retrospect, 1980 was a disaster from a monetary policy point of view. The U.S. economy su¤ered a recession along with a destabilizing in ‡ation scare 20 Goodfriend (2005) has the timing of the reversal slightly later, in the summer of 1982, based on evidence on long bond rates. 21 In ‡ation scares are instances of sharply rising long-term bond rates re ‡ecting rising long-term in ‡ation expectations. Indeed we see that after the …rst in ‡ation scare there is substantial loss in credibility (of about 10 basis points), even though in ‡ation is already declining. The second in ‡ation scare in 1981 was accompanied with an extraordinarily tight monetary policy, which was a very hard action to implement as recession deepened, but proved bene…cial in term of reversing, and sustaining, the downward path in credibility. The third in ‡ation scare, in the summer of 1984, was met with an equally determined Fed -"...For the …rst time in its history, the Fed successfully employed interest rate policy to hold the line on in ‡ation (at 4 percent) without creating a recession.", Goodfriend (2007) . The graph demonstrates how credibility is increasing throughout the length of the third in ‡ation scare, at levels which allow a costless tightening "...indicating that the Volcker Fed had acquired credibility for 4 percent trend in ‡ation.", Goodfriend (2007) . The parameter t is now above 0.9 and increasing, and both expectations as well as the implicit t have stabilized at just above 4 percent.
The fourth in ‡ation scare in October 1987 was qualitatively di¤erent. It is true that it was not till 1992 that bond yields returned to their 1987 levels, but by that time, both in ‡ation as well in ‡ation expectations had improved considerably and the level of credibility, as proxied by t , was hovering between 0.9 and 0.95. Alan Greenspan had replaced Volcker as chairman of the Fed in 1987, but the credibility acquired under the Volcker Fed was sustained, allowing for in ‡ation expectations to continue to fall. It would take 15 years (till the end of 1990s) for in ‡ation to stabilize around the 2 percent level, (…gure 8), at which point the Fed became fully credible, showing that "(T)he Federal Reserve under Greenspan was patient in moving toward its implicit in ‡ation target", Goodfriend (2007) .
Last, we observe that in the years since the start of the …nancial crisis at mid 2007, in ‡ation expectations for the …rst time in 10 years are above the 2 per cent mark, at a level of 2.1-2.3 per cent. At the same time in ‡ation is very volatile ranging from over 5 per cent to almost negative 2. This has caused t to enter a declining path, which reaches the value of 0.95 at the last date of our sample. Two questions arise: …rst, when will that trend revert and second, what is the critical threshold for t below which monetary policy is no longer credible. The …rst question is naturally very di¢ cult to answer, especially in view of the events in the …nancial markets since then. On the second question however, history shows us that periods during which monetary policy was considered to be credible corresponded to values of t generally greater than 0:9. Although not a formal test, this would imply that there is still some way (bu¤er) for expectations to move away from the implicit anchor, before credibility is compromised. Galati et al (2011) and Gerlach et al (2011) both show that of long run in ‡ation expectations are still anchored but also that in ‡ation expectations measures more volatile and uncertain. This fact con…rm the small reduction in monetary policy credibility here captured by the reduction in the value of t
Conclusions
Credibility is important for the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. First it provides the ‡exibility to deal with shocks without changing the trend of in ‡ation and second, it allows monetary authorities to disin ‡ate without much cost on real interest rates and output. Our conjecture has been that credible regimes imply a disconnect between in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. We have expressed this in terms of …ve testable hypotheses. Our empirical set-up has allowed us to develop a measure for the extent to which expectations are anchored, as well as at what level. The contribution of this paper is therefore to provide a method for quantifying the anchoring e¤ect, which we use as a proxy for credibility in applied monetary policy.
We apply this measure to US data since 1963. As the history of monetary policy in the US has periods for which credibility is known to be low, as well as periods for which it is known to be high, we check how well this measure compares to the way the literature describes them. We …nd that it typically matches the general description of the di¤erent levels of credibility across different periods. We also test the measure against four incidents of in ‡ation scares, as documented by Goodfriend (1993) , and show that the measure typically tracks the timing as well as direction of changes in this credibility proxy. At the heart of the argument made is the fact that credibility and the underlying anchor are not constant but are subject to changes as new data becomes available, a reminder that credibility can be gained but it can also be lost. It follows that,
As in the VAR(1) case, we can derive the and . In the case of a VAR (2), we then have:
t 2 + e 2t ; and
Therefore,
B Robustness Checks
In the empirical implementation, the lag length of the VAR is chosen based on recursive likelihood ratio tests for the non-signi…cance of the longest lag and on the Schwarz (BIC) information criterion, starting with a VAR(4). In both cases, the statistical congruence of the model is controlled by means of standard diagnostic tests on the residuals for no correlation, homoskedasticity and normality. These hypotheses are typically not rejected, in particular when the lag selection is based on testing. When the testing and information criteria give con ‡icting results on the lag length of the VAR, two VARs of di¤erent order are estimated in order to control the robustness of the results.
B.1 A note on Section 4.1
The recursive tests for lag length suggest a VAR(6), when starting with 8 lags, while the Schwarz criterion indicates a VAR (2) . Since the hypothesis of no serial correlation of the errors is rejected for the latter, we continue the analysis with the VAR(6), but there are minor di¤erences in the results with the VAR(2). We …nd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for either actual or expected in ‡ation over this sample, using an Augmented Dickey Fuller test. While this outcome could be the result of a small sample power of the test, as a …nal check on the robustness of the results we have repeated the analysis with an error correction model. We cannot reject the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector by the Johansen trace test, but the restriction that the coe¢ cients of the variables are 1 and 1 (i.e., that actual minus expected in ‡ation is stationary) is strongly rejected. Hypotheses 1 and 3 would require …rst no cointegration (otherwise the error correction term should be signi…cant in at least one of the equations, creating a dynamic link between actual and expected in ‡ation), and, second, no signi…cance of the lagged di¤erences of expected in ‡ation in the equation for the di¤erence of actual in ‡ation, and vice versa. Instead, we …nd cointegration, the error correction term is strongly signi…cant in both equations, and the cross lags are also signi…cant.
B.2 A note on Section 4.2
The lag selection is either 5, when based on testing, or 1, when based on the Schwarz criterion. Since for the VAR(1) the hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals is rejected, we present results based on the VAR(5). However, those for the VAR (1) Given the relatively high level of persistence estimated (0.95 for the Consensus Forecasts, the highest of the two), it is worth examining whether we can assume expectations to be stationary, or in other words whether the estimated persistence of 0.95 is signi…cantly di¤erent from 1. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for in ‡ation but not for in‡ation expectations. However as the sample considered is relatively small, unit root tests are not reliable. To examine the variables stationarity, we simulate stochastically the VAR(1) model over the period 2007:1-2050:2, and evaluate, …rst, whether and how quickly the values of actual and expected in ‡ation stabilize and, second, whether the long-run equilibrium values are compatible with the credibility assumption, in the sense that actual in ‡ation is not statistically di¤erent from expected in ‡ation. The simulation results show that both properties are satis…ed, and the convergence to the equilibrium, in the absence of shocks, is fairly quickly 22 . Finally, Consensus reports data also on in ‡ation expectations at shorter horizons, speci…cally, 1, 3, and 5 years (labelled In ‡1, In ‡3, and In ‡5, respectively). We have therefore repeated the analysis using these alternative series. In all cases, a VAR(1) is selected by the Schwarz criterion and it is su¢ cient to obtain uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normal residuals. The only exception is the VAR for In ‡1 and In ‡, for which three lags are needed to avoid correlation in the residuals, but qualitatively the results are equal to the VAR(1) case. For all the three measures of expectations, the results of the hypothesis testing are similar as for the In ‡10 case, in the sense that there is no dynamic or contemporaneous interaction between expectations and actual in ‡ation emerging from the VAR. This is not surprising for the 3-and 5-year horizon expectations, while one might expect a stronger dependence of the short 1-year horizon expectation on actual in ‡ation. Our …nding for In ‡1 could be due to a timing issue, a mismatch in timing between the expectation and realization data, which led Johnson (2002) to suggest the use of a slightly modi…ed de…nition of in ‡ation. Actually, when we adopt his de…nition of in ‡ation we …nd that In ‡ is strongly statistically signi…cant in the In ‡1 equation. 22 Results available from the authors.
B.3 A note on Section 5.1
We discuss in more detail here why our results di¤er from those in Clark and Nakata (2008) . To start with, Clark and Nakata (2008) analyze actual minus expected in ‡ation and the change in expected in ‡ation, rather than the levels of the two variables as in our case, and this transformation enhances stationarity. Moreover, they de-mean the interest rate variable using a constant (full-sample) estimate for the mean, while we allow for changes in the mean of all variables by including a time-varying 'constant' in the model. Hence, following the speci…cation choices of Clark and Nakata (2008) , the model in (13) ) + e 2t :
Our theoretical model requires that we estimate the VAR in levels. But if we estimate the model in (16) , using the same sample as in Clark and Nakata (2008), we also …nd much less evidence of parameter instability, (see Figure  10 below). Actually, coe¢ cients b t and c t are in practice stable, and the variability of d t is very limited. 23 Other di¤erences with respect to Clark and Nakata (2008) are in the precise de…nition of the variables, and in the fact that they allow for stochastic volatility in the VAR errors, which does not appear to be necessary in our case since the time-varying 'constant'already captures the volatility in in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations.
Last, since the analysis of the time-varying VAR has highlighted the sample 2000-2007 as a period of substantial stability, in line also with the descriptive statistics of Table 2 and the graphical evidence of …gure 1, it is worth repeating the analysis with a constant parameter VAR focusing on this most recent period. In addition to the results reported in Table 6 below, expected in ‡ation does not signi…cantly depend on its lag, and the persistence of in ‡ation (as measured by the coe¢ cient of its own lag) drops to 0.47. Hence, all the hypotheses 1-5 appear to be satis…ed for the US over the most recent period. 23 We should point out that we have experienced numerical convergence problems in the estimation of the model in (16), which are not present for (13) . However, Figure 11 is based on a model for which convergence of the numerical estimation procedure is achieved. Figure 11 : Based on the model by Clark and Nakata C An alternative measure for in ‡ation: PCE
We plot three alternative de…nitions for in ‡ation based on CPI, PCE and core PCE. Figure 11 shows that CPI is the most volatile of the three. We then recalculate the credibility proxy, , (grey line) based on PCE in‡ation (…gure ??). It is worth remembering however, that the expectation measure refers to CPI not PCE so that this derivation of is not entirely consistent. Since the PCE series is both lower on average and less volatile, the corresponding is also lower and smoother. This is particularly so for the start of the period of the Great Moderation. The evolution of credibility however, matches our previous analysis throughout the whole period. 
